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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE CITY,

:

Plaintiff-Respondent
vs.

:

WILL SAVAGE,

Case No. 14000

:

Defendant-Appellant
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE
CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction on a charge of loitering in
violation of Section 32-1-17 (5) Salt Lake City Ordinances 1965, as
amended.
' DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Appellant was convicted of loitering in Salt Lake City Court,
the Honorable Judge Paul Grant presiding. The decision was affirmed
on appeal in the Third District Court of Utah, the Honorable Judge
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , presiding. A motion for dismissal on
constitutional grounds was heard but overruled by the Court.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the conviction on the constitutional
grounds that the section of the ordinance under which he was convicted
is void for vagueness and overbreadth*
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the early morning of November 28, 1974, appellant drove
his vehicle into the parking lot of the Tri-Arc Travel Lodge, 161 West
2nd South, where he offered to help a police officer who was at that time
assisting a waitress in starting her car. His assistance not being required,
appellant drove his vehicle out of the parking lot but returned shortly
thereafter.

The police officer, Mr. Lowder, noted the license number

of the appellant's car and checked that number with the Utah Bureau of
Information. The Bureau informed the officer that the vehicle was regis tered to one Joe Van.
Officer Lowder and another officer, Mr. York, noticed the
same vehicle parked by the southwest corner of the hotel approximately
fifteen minutes after it had left the parking lot. Officer Lowder stationed
Officer York near the car and proceeded to the second floor where he
observed appellant approach a coke machine on that floor and then proceeded
down a staircase. The officer followed appellant to his car. Appellant
was asked to step out of the car by the officer.

The officer then proceeded

without asking appellant for identification or an explanation of his presence,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

to pat down appellant. The search produced no weapons. Another
officer, Mr. Boelter, assisted officer Lowder at this time. He
removed appellant's wig whereupon officer Lowder recognized appellant
as someone other than Joe Van. Officer Lowder asked appellant what
he was doing in the hotel to which appellant responded that he stopped
to get a coke and meet a female acquaintance. Testimony of officer
York indicated appellant possessed a can of coke when questioned.
Officer Lowder then placed appellant under arrest for loitering. Appellant
was found guilty of loitering in the Third District Court of Utah, Judge
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. , presiding. He appeals from that conviction.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue presented to the Court is whether Section
32-1-7 (5) Salt Lake City Ordinances 1965, as amended, is void for
vagueness and overbreadth.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 32-1-7 (5) SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCES 1965,
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS BECATJSTTrT130T^T3rjTT^
WAllNING^JXrCTTrZENS~OF A RULE WHICH IS TO BE OBEYED.
The ordinance under which appellant was convicted provides:
Section 32-1-17. Loitering. It shall be unlawful for any.
person to loiter in Salt Lake City. A person is guilty
of loitering when he:
(5)

Loiters, remains or wanders in or about a
.building, lot, street, sidewalk, or any other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
public orMachine-generated
private place
without apparent reason
OCR, may contain errors.

and under circumstances which justify suspicion
that he may be engaged in or about to engage in a
crime and:
(a) upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to
identify himself by name and address; or
(b) after having given his name and address by
inquiry of a police officer refuses or fails
to give a reasonably credible account of his
conduct and purpose.
It is a well established principle of due process that a law must
give fair notice of the offending conduct. To be consistent with the
requirements of due process a penal ordinance must contain certain
ascertainable standards of guilt, so that men of reasonable understanding
are not required to guess at the meaning of the ordinance. Winters vs.
People of State of New York,

333 U.S. 507(1948).

The United States Supreme Court in Papachristou vs. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156, 162 (1972), has stated that a penal law
is void for vagueness when it Mfails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute.
United States vs. Harriss, 347 U. S. 612, 667, 74 S. Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.
Ed. 989. " See Palmer vs. City of Euclid,

402 U. S. 544 (1971). In

Papachristou, supra , the Court ruled unconstitutional a Jacksonville
city ordinance which punished "common night walkers, M persons
1

'wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful

purpose or object" on the grounds that such ordinance did not give
fair notice of proscribed conduct and encouraged arbitrary and erratic
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.

a r r e s t s and convictions.Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In Shuttleswortli vs. City oOi^nTmgham, 382 1,1, S. .' 17 , <'w
(1965), the Court stated that if it were to rcau literally the cTy omhumee
wliich makes it an offense to "so sam.., .-••.= . . • . • . ; • . . i.>>.', ;.ny i^. iv-:i
or sidewalk . . . as to obstruct free passage over, ui, or along said street
or sidewalk" and. further provides that ".a slu.ii mso JK uniawi'ui .'or any
per:-**.". t'o ;^-;;r(J, or A ) . L C L.pw.. ;..,y MivcL or sidewalk of the city after
having been requested by a police o'^iccr to move or, f t the ordinance would
be unconsti tutional.

Spoakim. .'...-; he .najorie. i-.'thi Cui.r»:, Mr. Justice

Stewart stated:
Literally read, therefore, the second part of
this ordinance says that a person may stand on a
public sidewalk in Birminham only at the whim
of any police officer of thai city. The constitutional *"*\' :. '
vice of so broad a provision needs no demonstration.
It Tdoes not provide for government by clearly defined
laws, but rather for government by the moment-tomoment opinions of a policeman o\\ the beat. T Cox vs.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. o:>o, r/7^, h:. . . MJ. 2d 471, 501

'' 8lT^7T5tr453.
In Shuttleswortli

Lnc Court nekl LIKK' since the trial comrL may

have found the defendants giuhy ^y iiteauLy upplying me iineom,iaaLjv,a, i,y
•bro.ui iiTu.s t>; ;he ordinance, the conviction could not stand.

The Court

noticed, However, uua the ordinance was not necessarily unconstitutional
i

. ,"i i i:i . v.e

,. I *e s e r e 1 t \ u i r i s i \ i r s l ru.'d " ^ * •''w.i'.i. nee iiui'.'u

f
V1

• o ^uuiSu

only those persons wno aid i;ot ooey the request oi zr*c o m c e r to move
from the corner "though ^ r e t i r e s „o ^.va. .v-. ; • •,' ,..,a.Jna. h ••
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-5-

envisage situations in which, biich an ordinance might be unconstitutionally
up]

hkU,

."K!

(

^ J*t i

,'i

*''

.

^ People vs. i ^ r d L

300 N. LL. 2d 01, the New York Court

of Appcais dCCJLU rexi i.. ,coi»S. ../uii^jK,. a t*>aer, s. n s i . . \ A r ; e I\ iiv.t v M. ,t.oa; s c. = 1
verbatim to che oruinuncc nuv challenged.

Vhe ACW York statute

provided:
Section 240, 35. Loitering--A person is guilty of loitering
when he:
• (6) Loiters, remains or wanders in or about a place
without apparent reason and under suspicion that he
may be engaged or about to engage in c r i m e , and
upon inquiry by a peace officer, refuses to identify
himself or fails to give a reasonably credible account •
• of his conduct and purposes,
• The Court stated in Berck, supra, a t 413:

. .

• The statute in the case before us is not informative
on its face and utterly fails to give adequate notice
of the behavior it forbids. The statute contains two
substantive elements: (1) loitering 'in or about a •
place without apparent reason, T (2) under circumstances which 'justify suspicion' that a person 'may
be engaged or about to engage in c r i m e , ' Certainly,
in light of our decision in People vs. Diaz, 4 N. Y.
2d 469, 470, 176 N. Y. S. M 3 I 3 , 314, 151 N. E. 2d 871, .
872, supra--in wliich we held unconstitutionally vague
an ordinance penalizing lounging or loitering 'about
a n y . . . street corner . . . Dunkirk' - -the first
element standing alone could not possible be held to
give sufficient notice of the conduct proscribed. The
second element - - that the loitering be done under
circumstances which justify suspicion that a person
is engaged in or about to engage in crime is similarly
obscure. Assuredly, there a r e no coiivrnonly understood
set of suspicions circumstances of which all citizens
are aware and to which applicability of the statute is
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

../

1

restricted, in other words, this additional language
does not condemn any identifiable act or omission
or restrict the operation of the statute to a particular
place or a clearly defined set of circumstances but, rather,
it merely indicates that a person may be held for loitering
if suspicion of criminality happens to be created in the mind
of the arresting officer. In short, :as we declared in the
Dia_z case (4 N. Y. 2d, at p. -.7.1, WO N. Y.S. 22 at p. 2i5,
151 N. 12. 2u <\i. a„ <S/2)., tno statute tails not orny to point
up the prohibited act, either actual or threatened hut to
advise the citizen in sufficiently clear and unambiguous
t e r m s of the distinction between 'conduct calculated to
harm and thai. whi.cn is essentia\]y innocent. T
The standards set n.-r.;. ra iVipacnrJ^liX"., s t v r a , Slvatticswori r,
supra, and Berck, supra, a r e clear.

A penal law must give fair notice

to men of reasonable intelligence m CU.J^UOL a. ne r.\w,u^.,

.a wader

for an ordinance to give sucu notice JLL must clearly articulate the prohibited
act and. advise persons of conduct proscribed and that which is essentially

The Salt Lake City ordinance section now challenged makes

any other pur>i:;.o or private place without apparent reason, " thus making
com mon n ig i xc -1 x m c s i J.*O i i s n.. * i a w * u a. ». i. CuC a r rcs c j. i i g o i u c e r deems ti a c. "i
.^v.uuci- ":. . ,.-.clous" and is not satisfaied witn ti.e "rca^onaoiy credible
account" tendered
• :.vOtu i: rresi.

, . an explanation which b* hrrce^ iu »v given in order
..v.mVierai"'i'i «.v!i*v.,iirl«.,:»iv.rii\,s s m m a r to evening

constitutionals couk\ no "suspicions loitering" unaer this ordinance;
window shopping, >;oggii,;.,, -

, \e;\>, ;; m ^ v i -..M^ r x r n i s r v ;,*> a*nctical.ly

the entire populace.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The ordinance in question violates the due process d au.se under
the 14th Amendment In that the ordinance lacks any standard of
ascertainable guilt necessary to prevent arbitrary police action.

The

oru»I"M"Ii<vV 11*.*iiw.\-» v"*.*iii~i11it11, -\c iv H .i\i \\ri,i-* . .>\ «• i >.IV/JVJ ^ranaarc^ <iro
normally iiinoCGnt.

i ae iacA oL uejiHitcncsb OJ trie ordinance allows 010

police net to be cn^; : , • \;\ ry-y \.r.rv :.n •'*--. ;. .*• * <- : \1 r \,v.o .,;.. • v;,.;,n y
undesirable in the eyes of the police and prw^'cuaon, ahhot.!^; noL
cna rgen^ie V/ILII vuV)r -",Wi J'I. iCv n. i* C'UCIJ^O,

; i"^ • .--^_Vi ,<^'ii r>\ i~>\c t) At;'",(. i*iv?e

In tills ease is therefore void for lack of sufficient notice of conuuet to
be avoided.
POINT 11

" •

SECTION 324-17 (5) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT
PLACES UNFETTERED DISCRETION IN TIIE HANDS OF POLICE AND

p^^yTM^
.' The ordinance places virtually unfettered discretion in the hands
(h tiic police a in. li'n"* * ii"i courages tli\),[^\,rj

nu ut^c/i/iana/v; ry < run.V'. n^ it.

In Papacarisa>a, supra, i7\/, uie hupreme Court pointed out the
Infirmities of an ordinance waicn punisnos

waging or strolling about

without any lawful puposeM when it stated:
Those generally implicated by the Imprecise terms
of the ordinance--poor people, non-conformists,
dissenters, idlers--may be required to comport
themselves according to the lifestyle deemed
•. appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts.
Where, as here, there a r e no standards governing
the exercise of the discretion granted by the ordinance,
the scheme permits and encourages an arbitrary and
and discriminatory enforcement of the law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The ordinance now challenged contains no guidelines governing
the oote rrrd ra. iou as to whether a person is engaged in suspicious loitering.
The ordinance leaves to the sole discretion ov the police officer the d e t e r n'jjj'im i-•. •' • , '.; c\ •«^M •.; UP ; • - ••I-I^ICIUI!'- (*'.iA1 )*i«".',.

I'^iri/rou'iciit ot tiic o r -

dinance depends entirely upon WuCuicr the arresting officer is satisfied,
witii 11 iC rcasouao»y crem* J.c uu.vum

/»vvt. I*.• i . > • A • v • . •" .* w ;. ~:

was the case in IVopie vs. Soeck, ;mpra.

Ccrt-aimy WIKIL one person

considers "suspicious Loitering" may be considered totally innocent by
another,

S;;,,;hi."ir, Li±e ±nascertainable standard as to what constitutes

a "reasonably creuibie account' 1 of one's conduct may be construed in
r .nurac ra r. = c var.aacc r»v umcivrn pii.M. *, Ojiiccrs.
Thus, tr.e united Scales Supreme Coart in Papachristou, supra,
and Shuttles wor;;,, su^i'.., arn, ;... *- •• v'wrr

> •• .\ w. \p.>ra^ hi ; CL\.V, ^upr.-

stated that the requirement that an offender "give a satisfactory account"
of his conduct is not Sunicjcn'Liy certain to satisfy due process rocai.v./.efits
sh.* • - .a- .....y JJC satisfactory to one officer may be unsatisfactory to
anotner, and even the word "satisfactory" is not susceptible to any standard
O

^'XciCiuCS^

, *»,* . * v.*. i-

..^H^.I

1

M * .^Li i i •«~ • w T . . - .^-1 i . :-> i <• d

,Uii,

2 o ; v „ i J # i\.

3d

841.

522, 525, L i le S up rem VJ L-* ou r t o i L t \i \ ^ s L <I re e ; c n a IU a n o r ^ i n a a c e \v 11 a c i \ ma o e it
unlawful for any person "wandering or loitering abroad, or abroad urn.er
other susp;cin u s circumstances at niglit, io ,'iui to give satisfactory account
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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s^-p u-Jw o a 1 -f T 11^^ry Aoi-*nn r.H r^f a r\r\\in<=> n f f i P p r M f n h o i i n r n 11R1 if] 11 10UH1 a S V I O l a . t i V e

of due process as imposing sanctions upon conduct that may not manifest
unitiwin; jx.r^MK-M". Yio1 A\ r ,iiM.k\' si^^tl:
As we interpret the cases dealing with loitering
ordinances, the right of law enforcement officers
to inquire of persons wandering abroad at night
is limited to those persons whose conduct gives
the officer reason for alarm that they a r e engaged
in unlawful activity. The crime, however, cannot
be the failure to give answers satisfactorily ;o rhe
officer.
If the ordinance means that the legality of a
person's actions depends upon the opinion of a
policeman, it would be unconstitutional. City of
Portland vs. Goodwin, 187 Or. 509, 426, 210 P.
2d 577 (1949)7
Thus, whether a per.so.i ,^ ,Kiuh\! w,7 ,;w /(i ., w „s i.i^A^u 1;.' •
freedom depends entirely upon \ ;-.e warn; OL cue officer in determining
what is suspicious loitering and what constitutes a "reasonably credible
i >vwu.i/' u,' .. ^i.spoc."1 - r. .,.lt..c: or purpose.
hi ruiing unconstitutional subsections (3) and (6) of Section 17-2-16
Salt 1 ,a i\C *',•'/ O \,;:",; * *r. .\ \s w •••>'* c \\ ">r..>\M;o-» par. i.s a. .~.i.vi .v*r ' i'-vr-r--" p^-i'Suri
w ho r Oci m s a i o u t 'i rot \ * p i a c e i o p ^; ce w i tI; ou L a uy i a w i u i nus ine s s

o."

every persr-i. Vv,.o v.anucrs u.c S J W - L UL mo. ••.* .•;.u;-u.«. L i.on,*.-- o tr.e a"j;;Y.L*,
without any visible or lawful business, the court in Decker vs. Fillis,
306 F. Supp. 613 (1969) stated:
• • • The provisions . . . would penalize economic condition
of status, render mere lawful presence on the street or
in other public places in the absence of 'business' there
a c r i m e , and certainly chill the liberty of lawful movement,
presence andphysical status by such an overbreadth
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
of prohibition Machine-generated
as to literally
cover
almost any person loitOCR, may
contain errors.

in the nighttime. The differentiation among those to be
prosecuted or not prosecuted is left entirely to the police
without reasonable guidelines between lawful or unlawful status
or conducL They violate substantive due process under the
14th Amendment. Goldman vs. Knecht, 295 F. Supp. 897,
908 (D. Colo. 1969); Hughes vs. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881
(E. D. Pa, 1968); Territory of Hawaii vs. Anduhe, 48 F .
2d 171 (9th Cir. 1931); Smith vs. Hill, 285 F. Supp. 556
(E. D. No. Car. 1968). See Powell vs. Texas, 392 U. S.
514, 88 S. Ct. 2145, 20 L. Ed. 2d 1254 (1968); Robinson
vs. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S. Ct. 1417, 8 L. Ed. 2d
758 (1962).
Because the challenged section of the ordinance encourages an
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the law due to a lack of any
ascertainable standards governing a r r e s t and conviction under the
ordinance, the ordinance renders fair even-handed administration
of justice a virtual impossibility.

It should therefore be declared

unconstitutional,
POINT III
SECTION 5 OF THE ORDINANCE UNDERCUTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT THAT ARRESTS ARE LAWFUL ONLY UPON A SHOWING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE.
Under Section 5 a person may be arrested on suspicion only.
Probable cause as a means by which some standards of enforcement may
be employed to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory a r r e s t s a r e dispensed
with by the ordinance.

As the Supreme Court stated in Papachristou,

405 U.S. , at 169:
We allow our police to make a r r e s t s only on 'probable
cause, T a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard
applicable to the States as well as to the Federal Government. Arresting a person on mere suspicion, like
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
arresting
a person
for investigation, is foreign to our
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'suspicious' persons would not pass constitutional muster.
A vagrancy prosecution may be merely the cloak for a
conviction which could not be obtained on the real but
undisclosed grounds for the a r r e s t .
Similarly, the court found in Berck, supra, at 415, that the lack
of probable cause was equally inherent in the ordinance section under
its consideration.

That ordinance section was practically identical

verbatim with the one now challenged and was declared unconstitutional.
The courts in both the Berck, supra p. 415, and Drew, supra p. 526,
noted rejection by the American Law Institute of a loitering provision
(Model Penal Code Section 250.12 [Tent. Draft No. 13, 1961]) very much
like the Salt Lake ordinance now challenged.
Tentative Draft No. 13 provided:
A person who liters or wanders without apparent
reason or business in a place or manner not usual
for law-abiding individuals and under circumstances
which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about
to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses
the request of a peace officer that he identify himself
of Ms conduct and purpose.
The institute adopted instead a much more tightly drawn provision
(Model Penal Code Section 250. 6 [Proposed Official Draft, 1962]) in order
"to save the section from possible invalidation as a subterfuge by which
the police would be empowered to a r r e s t and search without probable cause. M
(Comment p. 227, to Model Penal Code Section 250. 6 [Proposed Official
Draft, 1962]).
The ordinance adopted by the Institute provides:
Model
Penal
Code,
Section
250.
6 [Proposed
Digitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law School,Official
BYU.
OCR, may contain
Draft, 1962]: Machine-generated
A person commits
a errors.
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or prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual
for law abiding individuals under circumstances that
warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property
in the vicinity. Among the circumstances which
may be considered in determining whether such
alarm is warranted is the fact that the actor takes
flight upon appearance of a peace officer, refuses to
identify himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal
himself or any object. Unless flight by the actor or
other circumstances makes it impracticable, a peace
officer shall prior to any arrest for an offense under
this section afford the actor the opportunity to dispel
any alarm which would otherwise be warranted, by
requesting him to identify himself and explain his
presence and conduct. No person shall be convicted
of an offense under this section if the peace officer
did not comply with the preceding sentence, or if it
appears at trial that the explanation given by the actor
was true and, if believed by the peace officer at the
time, would have dispelled the alarm.
The revised ordinance adopted by the Institute has recently been
upheld as constitutional in State vs. Ecker,

17 Cr. L. 2001, where the

Florida Supreme Court held that the new ordinance, identical to the Model
Penal Code Section 250. 6 above, was a constitutional replacement to the
ordinance struck down in Papachriston, supra.
Lacking the requirement of prabable cause to arrest, the ordinance
enables law enforcement officials to harass so-called undesirables.
For example, in People vs. Williams, 55 Misc. 2d 774, 776, 286 N. Y. S.
2d 575, 577, (New York City Crim. Ct. 1967), the court commented that:
These defendants are 41 of a group of alleged
prostitutes who have been arrested and detained
2500 times in New York City . . . This Court of
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its own knowledge is aware that except for a few
isolated instances where defendants pleaded guilty,
the disorderly conduct cases were dismissed. In
many instances, Tthe girls' were arrested after
9:30 p. m. , too late to be arraigned, night courts
had been adjourned, then kept overnight in a cell.
In the morning they were brought to Court and
released because offenses for which they had been
arrested could not be proven to have been committed
by them.
The Fourth Amendment requires that arrests be predicated
upon probable cause, Beck vs. Ohio, 379 U. S. 89 (1964); Henry vs.
United States, 361 U. S. 98 (1959); Palmer vs. Euclid,

402 U. S. 544

(1971). The Salt Lake Ordinance section permits arrests and convictions
for suspicion or for possible crime based on circumstances less compelling
than the reasonable stop and frisk factors which are required to sustain
a mere on-the=scene frisk. Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968).
The ordinance flies in the face of these well established authorities
and should be found to be unconstitutional as a violation of appellants
Fourth Amendment guarantees.
POINT IV
THE ORDINANCE SECTION SERVES NO STATE INTEREST
CONSISTENT WITH THE FOURTH & FIFTH AMENDMENT.' THE
ORDINANCE FURTHER VIOLATES THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Appellant recognizes the right of a police officer to stop and
question a person, but a person's silence cannot be used as an idependent
source giving rise to probably cause for arrest. Davis vs. Mississippi,
Digitized
by then.p.
Howard W.
394 U.S. 721,
727,
6.Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The United States Supreme Court in Davis vs. Mississippi,
supra, held that police have no right to compel an answer from a citizen
stopped for questioning. This is what, in fact, the ordinance now challenged
compels. In Davis, supra p. 726, the Court noted the violation of appellant's
Fourth Amendment rights by dragnet procedures employed to take fingerprints from scores of individuals. The Court stated:
. . . But to argue that the Fourth Amendment does not
apply to the investigatory stage is fundamentally to
misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
Investigatory seizure would subject unlimited numbers
of innocent persons to the harassment and ignominy
incident to involuntary detention. Nothing is more
clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to
prevent wholesale intrusions upon the personal security
of our citizenry, whether those intrusions be termed
'arrests 1 or investigatory detentions.
In

Terry vs. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Supreme Court

specifically rejected the concept that the Fourth Amendment is not
involved where the conduct of officers amounts to something less than
a technical arrest or a full-blown search. Thus, under Terry, supra,
Fourth Amendment restrictions must be followed and under Davis, supra,
the officer cannot require an answer even in an ''investigatory detention.,T
Section 32-1-17 (5) violates the Fifth Amendment because "it
punishes a person who fails to identify himself . . . or give an account
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of his . . . conduct and purposes. " Berck, supra 415. Under the
ordinance a person is given the choice of not answering an officer's
questions and being arrested for that silence and incriminating himself
by tendering a statement which the officer deems not be a "reasonably
credible account. M
Because the ordinance allows an officer to by-pass the Fourth
Amendment requirement of probable cause for a search or seizure
and further requires a person to incriminate himself through silence,
contrary to Davis, the ordinance violates the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.
The ordinance further violates constitutional rights guaranteed
under the Fourteenth Amendment by restricting the free mo vement
of citizens through the State of Utah.
The ordinance touches upon the inalienable rights of citizens to
do what he will and when he will, so long as his course of conduct is not
inimical to himself or the general public of which he is a part. Thus, the
court in Hawaii vs. Anduha, (1931, CA 9 Hawaii) 48 F. 2d 171, found
that while it cannot be questioned that legislation against the obstruction
of public streets and highways, whether caused by idlers or loiterers,
is proper, a regulation as broad as the one challenged is wholly unnecessary
for that purpose. The challenged ordinance in that case provided that any
person who habitually loafed or loitered or remained idle on any public
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

street or highway or in any public place was guilty of a misdemeanor.
As the facts of this case indicate, the loitering ordinance has been enforced
in as broad a manner as the ordinance declared void in Anduha, supra.
There is no legitimate public interest requiring an ordinance as broad as
this one.
The courts in State vs. Caez, 81 NJ Super 315, 195 A. 2d 496,
and Decker vs. Fillis, supra, holding a loitering and vagrancy ordinance
invalid for vagueness, cited with approval the decision in Hawaii vs.
Anduha, supra, as standing for the proposition that no ordinance may
unreasonably or unnecessarily interfere with a person's freedom, whether
it be to move about or to stand still. 25 A. L. R. 3d 856, 846.
The Salt Lake City Ordinance section prohibits merely standing
about in any public or private place if the officer determines in his own
mind that such conduct is ''suspicious, ,f and the person is either unable
to give a "reasonably credible accounttT of his conduct or fails to identify
himself by name and address. Thus, whether a person remains for
twenty seconds or twenty minutes in a particular spot, makes no difference
the way the ordinance section is worded. A person may be subjected
to an investigatory stop and questioning for totally innocent behavior
and may suffer the indignation of arrest and incarceration by refusing
to identify himself or give what the officer, at that time and with no guidelines
to aid him by whi^h the conduct of the individual may be ascertained determines
in his own mind
to bybe
a "reasonably
credible
account
ofBYU.
his conduct. "
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Such an intrusion into individual liberty is certainly abhorent to the Consti tution and the basic principles upon which this country was founded, that
is the freedom to do as one wishes so long as the conduct is not inimical
to others.
As the Court pointed out in Anduha, supra, p. 173, to loiter is
to consume time idly or to waste time. These words have no sinister
meaning and imply no wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of those
engaged in the prohibited practices. It is common knowledge that the
majority of mankind spend goodly parts of their waking hours in idling
time away, and much of that time is spent in public as well as private
places. The ordinance section now challenged includes "loitering11 in
private places. Certainly an ordinance which allows this breadth of police
action, whereby police could arrest someone for loitering around Ms own
home if that person refused to identify himself or give a reasonably
credible answer, is unconstitutional as a deprivation of inherent liberties
afforded by the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution.

,
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CONCLUSION
The ordinance now challenged violates due process because
it does not give a person of "reasonable intelligence" unequivocal warning
of proscribed conduct. The ordinance now challenged does not comport
with the due process standard set out in Papachristou, supra, Shuttlesworth,
supra, and Berck, supra. The Berck case involved an ordinance practically
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void for vagueness. The cases cited above have held that a penal
ordinance must contain an ascertainable standard by which illegal conduct
and totally innocent behavior may be judged.
Section 32-1-17 (5) contains neither an unequivocal warning
to citizenry or conduct to be avoided nor does it contain an ascertainable
standard by which a person's conduct may be judged. The section is
clearly unconstitutional as a violation of due process.
The ordinance section now challenged places unfettered discretion
in the hands of police and prosecution. The ordinance section allows a
peace officer to arrest an individual if he determines the person to be
wandering or standing in any public or private place so as to arouse
suspicion, and either fails to identify himself or cannot tender a reasonably
credible explanation of his conduct. The Supreme Court of the United States
in cases cited by appellant has repeatedly declared unconstitutional ordinances
of this nature whereby the arresting officer determines what is

M

suspicious"

and what constitutes a "reasonably credible" account of a suspect's
conduct.
The ordinance section does not provide for government by
clearly defined laws but rather for goverment by the moment-to-moment
conclusions drawn by police officers with no standard by which conduct
may be judged. The facts of this case further indicate the arbitrary and
discriminatory fashion in which this ordinance is enforced. Because of
its overbreadth the ordinance encourages erratic and arbitrary arrests.
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Appellant was removed from his car, searched, and had his wig
removed by officers even before being asked to produce identification.
After tendering an explanation of his conduct and purposes, appellant was
arrested for loitering. Certainly thepublic policy argument against such
treatment by officers encouraged by the ordinance section are compelling.
The police cannot be armed with such an ordinance which has been shown
to be used as a harassing technique. See People vs. Williams, supra.
Section 32-1-7 (5) violates Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees.
The ordinance section unconstitutionally dispenses with the
requirement that arrests be founded on probable cause and instead, allows
arrest upon any conduct which a police officer considers suspicious coupled
with the failure of a suspect to produce identification or give a reasonably
credible account of his conduct and purposes. Whether an explanation is
reasonably credible is again an individual decision by the officer with no
standards by which the conduct may be judged. The ordinance therefore
violates the Fourth Amendment.
Under Davis, supra, and Drew, supra, a person cannot be subjected
to arrest by his silence. To so subject citizens to arrest by remaining
silent violates the Fifth Amendment as stated in Davis, supra, and Drew,
supra. The ordinance now challenged does exactly that which is prohibited.
The ordinance thus flies in the face of well recognized principles of law
and should be declared unconstitutional.
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The ordinance further violates the orivileees and immunities

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment be unreasonably and unnecessarily
restricting freedom, whether it is the freedom to move about or stand
still. The courts in State vs. Caez, supra, and Decker vs. Fillis, supra
have cited Hawaii vs. Anduha, supra, as standing for the proposition
that no ordinance may unreasonably or unnecessarily interfere with a
person's freedom.

Whether a person can move about or merely stand

still depends upon the individual officer's assessment of that person's
conduct, an assessment for which no ascertainable standards have been
established to aid in determining the supposedly suspicious conduct.
The ordinance therefore restricts movement and other personal freedoms
by its breadth. Therfore, the ordinance should be declared unconstitutionally
void for vagueness and overbreadth.
Respectfully submitted,

STEPHEN R. McCAUGHEY
Attorney for Appellant
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